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BOOK REVIEWS

The American Language of Rights. By Richard A. Primus.
(Cambridge:
$54.95.)

Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 280.

Richard P1imus's The American Language of Rights is a
well-reasoned and thoughtful response to those scholars (such as
Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Joseph Raz and
Cass Sunstein) and practitioners who use American rights as reasons, meaning that they are often employed as if they have no
normative underpinnings, and/or regard rights as a philosophically sophisticated and consistent doctrine, the meaning of which
has unfolded over time to envelop all members of the political
community and many of its demands. Instead, according to Primus, rights are a social practice informed by substantive political
commitments. Those commitments are embodied in the rights
we create which then change in response to social and historical
conditions. If rights, Primus inquires, do not hail from God, nature, or abstract human reason, for example, and they have not
meant the same things over the course of American history, then
why is it that certain claims enjoy the status of rights? Moreover, why have the form and content of rights changed over time,
and what factors influenced the ways in which we talk about,
construct, and apply rights? Rights discourse thus develops
"through a pattern of adversity, reaction, and synthesis" (129),
which is illustrated, he argues, in three critical historical periods
that have altered rights in fundamental ways: the Founding, Reconstruction, and World War II. If rights are in fact a social
practice (as opposed to a formal understanding of rights such as
those premised on a universal set of moral or normative impera tives) that have the capacity to change in response to historical
circumstances, it would stand to reason that the "language of
rights does not attach to only one kind of political outcome" (2).
Instead it has been a "versatile tool, suitable for many different
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agendas" (3) , in opposition to many of the critical legal studies
and communitarian scholars who want to argue that rights discourse has a tendency to "favor one set of political outcomes
over another" (2)-a claim Primus considers "widely overstated"
(2).
Hence Primus argues that during the Founding, there were
multiple sources of rights: traditional English liberties, natural
rights, reason, benefit and God. The founders and other politically engaged individuals drew upon those sources to speak
about rights in ways that would justify opposition to specific adversities, such as the abuse of legislative power, as well as "remembered" adversities, like the forced quartering of British
troops in private homes.
As Americans progress into the Reconstruction era, what
gets counted as a right and to whom certain rights ought to be
expanded changes substantially in response to the conclusion of
the Civil War and the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation.
Again, the language of rights is partially embedded in earlier
understandings but also creates new ones to accommodate responses to unique historical occurrences-and
Primus argues
persuasively in this chapter that the Reconstruction era saw
much less in the way of rights claims made from abstract principle than in any of the other t\vo key periods. Instead, many of
the Northern whites who became active abolitionists did so at
least partially because of their fear of what denying or limiting
the free speech and labor opportunities of former slaves, for example , might do to their own rights to the same.
It is during this period as well that political scholarship and
practice begin to refer to rights as belonging to one of three categories: civil, political or social. This division, which is by no
means stable , was an attempt to legitimate selective application
of rights to African-Americans, where early on they were to enjoy only civil rights, or "the minimum basic requirements for
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distinguishing free persons from slave laborers" (155), but not
political and social rights that would guarantee the suffrage, the
right to hold office and equal access to public accommodations
(particularly white educational facilities). As the denial of a
certain "political" or "social" right to African-Americans became
politically untenable, it was simply re-categorized as a civil right
until "civil rights" became "synonymous with legal or constitutional rights in general" ( 160).
The third period that demonstrates a definitive shift in how
we talk about rights in the American context, according to Primus, is the years immediately following World War II, during
which the primary adversary was totalitarianism as informed by
the practices and ideologies of Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union. It is during this period that a "new vocabulary of 'human
rights ' arose to carry the content of those political commitments
and to link them with a broader idea rarely seen in the generation
before the war but ascendant thereafter: that certain rights exist
and must be respected regardless of the positive law" (178).
I was surprised, however, to encounter virrually no careful discussion of the individual character of rights. That is, we
are indeed a culture of rights, and those rights, as Primus deftly
points out, have changed in important and fundamental ways due
to social and historical conditions. Yet American rights are not
just this. If we can say anything that is distinctive about American rights it is that they almost always only accrue to individuals.
Primus clearly and persuasively illustrates the ways in which the
Founding, Reconstruction, and Worid War II altered how we
think about rights-what we say about them. what gets counted
as a right, etc.-but there is almost no mention of to whom those
rights are to apply. I find this perplexing because if American
rights have predominantly been individual rights. might not such
an understanding privilege a certain kind of political outcome?
It might very well favor liberal political arrangements to the exTHE JOURNAL
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clusion of other types, but it is not at all clear that liberalism can
satisfy the demands of justice and/or democracy.
Early on Primus states that the language of rights does not
favor only one kind of political outcome because (1) the relationship between language and politics is reciprocal, and (2) it is
historical fact that "people with all sorts of differing political
views can use the language of rights to their advantage" (2).
Generally speaking , rights need not engender excessive individualism , as some communitarians allege , but they can operate
to privilege rights over responsibilities and self-interest over cooperation when they function in an already individualistic political culture dominated by a language that prioritizes claims made
on behalf of individuals (as opposed to groups , for example). In
such a climate , citizens with very different ideas (i.e. non-liberal
ideas) may very well be able to employ the language of rights to
make their claims , but some claims will not be heard-and even
if heard, will continually be dismissed (because the claims entail
non-liberal solutions for the satisfaction of justice and/or require
a recognition of demands made by citizens as members of some
group). To put it more directly , Primus is keenly aware of the
ways in which American rights have been conditioned both by
inherited understandings of rights and the novel uses to which
they can be put to stave off undesirable political outcomes, yet
he fails to interrogate the ways in whi ch rights are too often formulated by those who already enjoy a privikged status in the
polity (and presumably want to retain that status). For the privileged , an ethos of individualism and individual rights has the
capacity to work almo st flawles sly. For those marginalized due
to their race , class, gender , and/or sexuality , such an ethos often
functions to justify that marginalization on the basis of misperception of interests or simple lazines s- but not as the result of a
systemati c flaw.
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With that said, Richard Primus's The American Language
of Rights ought to be required reading for anyone interested in
the practice of American rights. His analysis of historical documents to bolster his claims about the construction and reconstruction of rights is exemplary and persuasive. Furthermore, his
arguments illustrating the erroneous ways in which rights are
often used as final justifications for political propositions-and
even more otlen referred to as if they have always meant the
same things-are well-informed and convincing.
Angela D. Ledford
University of South Carolina-Columbia
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